Robotics in manufacturing: the India report
SRF Capital Studio Research DeskFunding Intelligence, SRF Capital StudioIndia installs more industrial robots than all but five countries, yet runs one of the thinnest robot fleets per factory worker. This report maps who buys, who earns the margin, and where an Indian company can build something defensible.
Summary
- India installed 9,120 industrial robots in 2024, sixth in the world, but its fleet of about 52,600 is small for an economy of its size, and almost every arm is imported.
- The profit in robotics sits at the ends of the chain: precision components and software on one side, service contracts on the other. Assembly and project integration, where most Indian firms operate, earn the least.
- The Indian companies worth building or backing are the ones turning one-off installations into recurring revenue, and the MSME market opens only when someone solves the financing, not the technology.
Most writing about robots in Indian factories starts with the density gap and ends with a prediction that the gap will close. That framing is accurate and not very useful. It tells an investor the market will grow. It doesn't tell anyone which part of the market will make money, or who will capture it.
This report tries to answer the second question. It covers the global context, the Indian market and the people who actually pay for robots here, the value chain and where margin concentrates, what the audited numbers at FANUC, ABB and Yaskawa reveal, how Indian players mature and where they stall, the drivers and risks for the next five years, and what a founder, an MSME owner or an investor should do about it.
A word on sources. Market-size estimates for robotics disagree with each other, sometimes by a factor of two, because firms define the market differently. Where we quote one, we name it. Where a widely repeated number could not be traced to a primary source, we left it out. The list at the end says what we relied on.
The global picture
The International Federation of Robotics counts every industrial robot shipped, and its World Robotics 2025 report is the base layer for everything else. Factories worldwide installed 542,000 robots in 2024, more than twice the figure of a decade earlier and the fourth straight year above half a million. The operating fleet reached about 4.66 million units, up 9% on the year.
Asia took 74% of those installations. China alone installed 295,000 robots, 54% of the world total, and now runs more than two million. Europe took 16% and the Americas 9%. IFR expects about 575,000 installations in 2025 and forecasts the annual figure will pass 700,000 by 2028. Those are projections, and the industry has a long history of cyclical dips tied to car-plant spending, so treat them as direction rather than destiny.
In money terms, Grand View Research puts the global industrial robotics market at about USD 37.8 billion in 2025 and projects USD 60.6 billion by 2030, a compound rate of 9.9%. Broader definitions that fold in service, surgical and warehouse robots produce figures two to three times larger. Neither is wrong. They measure different things, and anyone quoting a robotics market size should say which one.
One industry, several businesses
The most common mistake in reading this sector is to treat it as one market. A six-axis welding arm sold to a car plant on a five-year capex plan, a collaborative arm sold to a 40-person electronics assembler, and a fleet of mobile robots rented to a warehouse operator are three different businesses. They have different buyers, sales cycles, service burdens and margins.
Growth is uneven across them too. Articulated arms for automotive and general industry remain the volume core. Collaborative robots and autonomous mobile robots are growing much faster from a smaller base. Conventional Cartesian and low-end SCARA systems for simple pick-and-place are growing slowly. A company's prospects depend less on the industry's headline growth rate than on whether its own segment is outrunning it.
What we think of the AI and humanoid story
Much of the current commentary on robotics gives a great deal of space to physical AI and humanoid robots. The underlying shift is real: robots that use vision and learned models can handle a part that is slightly out of place or a product variant they were never explicitly programmed for, and platform vendors such as NVIDIA are pushing hard to become the default software layer.
For an Indian manufacturer in 2026, though, humanoids are a watching brief. The economics against a conventional arm or a human operator at Indian wages don't work yet. The practical consequence of the AI shift is narrower and more immediate: vision inspection, adaptive welding and easier programming are making robots viable on high-mix lines that could not justify them five years ago. That matters far more to a Pune auto-component plant than any humanoid pilot in South Carolina.
India: market size and segments
IMARC Group values India's robotics market, covering industrial, collaborative and service robots, at USD 1.98 billion in 2025, roughly ₹17,000 crore at ₹85 to the dollar. It projects USD 7.38 billion by 2034, a compound rate of 15.74%. Estimates for the industrial-robot slice alone vary more than twofold across research firms, depending on whether they count integration, software and service or only the hardware.
Collaborative robots are the fastest-growing piece. Research and Markets sizes the Indian cobot market at USD 148.82 million in 2025, rising to USD 689.08 million by 2031 at 29.1% a year. Other firms put the current market at a fraction of that, which tells you how thin the underlying data is. The direction is not in doubt. The level is.
Volume data is firmer, because IFR counts units rather than modelling revenue. India installed 9,120 industrial robots in 2024, a record and 7% more than the year before, and moved up to sixth place worldwide behind China, Japan, the United States, Korea and Germany. Its operating stock reached 52,570 units, tenth in the world. The five most automated countries run fleets of roughly 300,000 to two million. We look at what that gap does and doesn't mean in India's robot density against its peers.
Who installed industrial robots in India in 2024
| Buyer group | Robots installed in 2024 | Change on 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Automotive parts suppliers | 2,100 | +40% |
| Car and vehicle makers | 1,980 | -3% |
| Plastics and chemical products | 600 | +33% |
| Metal industry | 420 | +30% |
| All sectors, India | 9,120 | +7% |
That table carries the most important fact in this report. For the first time, automotive component suppliers bought more robots than the vehicle makers themselves. The automotive sector as a whole took 4,070 units, 45% of the total, but the growth came from the supplier base, which is made up of mid-sized firms and a long tail of MSMEs. The next wave of Indian robot demand is coming from companies that run on bank lines rather than board-approved capex budgets.
Who actually pays for robots in India
Three kinds of buyer operate side by side, and a vendor that sells to all three with one playbook usually serves none of them well.
Large manufacturers and Tier-1 suppliers. Vehicle makers, large component groups and electronics contract manufacturers buy through a formal capex cycle, often with a 12 to 18 month sales process and a written return model. Once a robot is designed into a line, switching is expensive, so they buy on reliability and service coverage and negotiate hard on price over multi-year contracts.
Mid-sized and small manufacturers. Here the founder decides, often in reaction to a specific trigger: a customer , a quality complaint, a labour shortage, a new programme under a PLI-linked anchor buyer. Upfront price is the main barrier. They care about how quickly a technician can reach them when the arm stops, and they are the buyers most open to paying monthly instead of buying outright.
System integrators. Integrators buy robots to build them into cells for end customers. They are brand-agnostic by necessity: they choose whichever arm makes the project economics work, and their loyalty follows distributor pricing and support. For a robot maker, integrators are both a channel and a negotiating counterparty.
We look at this buyer split in more detail, including what it means for how vendors should sell, in who buys industrial robots in India.
The value chain, and where India sits in it
A factory robot passes through five layers before it earns its keep. Each has a different capital requirement and a very different margin.
The five layers of the industrial robotics value chain
| Layer | What it does | Who leads | Indicative gross margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| Precision components | Reducers, servo motors, controllers, sensors | Nabtesco, Harmonic Drive, Sumitomo, Yaskawa, FANUC in-house | 60 to 70% |
| Robot makers (OEMs) | Design, assembly, controller software, global service | Fanuc, abb, Yaskawa, KUKA, Kawasaki, Epson | 25 to 35% |
| System integration | Cell design, programming, installation, commissioning | Hundreds of regional firms, OEM partner networks | 15 to 25% |
| Software and AI | Simulation, vision, fleet management, analytics | NVIDIA, Siemens, OEM platforms, specialist firms | 60 to 80% |
| Service and aftermarket | Maintenance, spares, training, contracts | OEMs and specialist service firms | 45 to 60% |
The chain is concentrated at both ends and competitive in the middle. Components and software hold pricing power. Robot assembly holds it only for the top brands. Integration, the layer where most of India's automation firms live, is engineering-heavy, capital-light and relationship-driven, and earns the thinnest margins of all.
The component chokepoint
Every six-axis arm contains four to six precision reducers, the gearboxes that turn fast motor rotation into slow, strong, exact joint movement. Reducers, servo motors and controllers together make up most of a robot's component cost. The heavy-duty RV reducers used in the base, shoulder and elbow come overwhelmingly from Nabtesco, which estimates its own share of that segment at about 60%. The smaller harmonic reducers used in wrists come largely from Harmonic Drive Systems.
For an Indian company that wants to build its own arms, this is the binding constraint. It can import reducers at prices set by suppliers who sell far larger volumes to its competitors. It can try to develop reducers domestically, which is a long, expensive programme with no guarantee of reaching the tolerances needed. Or it can aim at categories where precision requirements are looser. None of those is a quick route to a competitive product.
Why India lives in integration
India imports nearly all its robot hardware. Japanese brands lead by units, KUKA and ABB are strong in automotive and process applications, and Universal Robots leads collaborative arms. Domestic arm makers such as TAL Manufacturing Solutions, Systemantics and Svaya Robotics exist, but their combined share is small.
What India does have is engineering depth at modest cost, which is exactly what integration needs. An arm from Japan cannot weld a bracket in Chakan until someone designs the cell, programs the path, fits the gripper and safety guarding, commissions the line and trains the operators. That work is where Indian firms compete today. The founder question is how to earn more than an integrator's margin from that position, which we take up in the robotics value chain and India's integrators.
Economics: what the leaders' numbers show
Three listed companies anchor the industry's financial benchmarks. Their numbers show that scale alone does not decide who makes money in robotics. Structure does.
FANUC's results for its fiscal year ended 31 March 2026
| FANUC, consolidated | Year to March 2025 | Year to March 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net sales (¥ billion) | 797.1 | 857.8 | +7.6% |
| Operating income (¥ billion) | 158.8 | 183.8 | +15.7% |
| Operating margin | 19.9% | 21.4% | +1.5 points |
| Net income (¥ billion) | 147.6 | 166.5 | +12.9% |
| Robot division sales (¥ billion) | 329.6 | 378.6 | +14.9% |
| Robot share of sales | 41.3% | 44.1% | +2.8 points |
FANUC earned an operating margin of 21.4% on sales of about ¥858 billion, around USD 5.7 billion at ¥150 to the dollar. Its robot division grew faster than the group and now makes up 44% of sales. It has sustained margins near this level for years, including through downturns in Chinese factory spending.
ABB Robotics is the contrast. The division generated about USD 2.3 billion of revenue in 2024 with an operational EBITA margin of 12.1%, well below the rest of ABB. In April 2025 ABB said it would spin the unit off as a listed company. In October 2025 it switched to a sale, agreeing to sell the division to SoftBank Group for an enterprise value of USD 5.375 billion. The European Commission cleared the deal in March 2026, and at its second-quarter results in July 2026 ABB still expected completion in the second half of 2026. Until the closing is announced, ABB Robotics should be treated as sold but not yet transferred.
Yaskawa sits between the two. Its robotics segment was forecast to earn about ¥21.7 billion of operating profit on ¥236 billion of revenue for the year to February 2026, a margin of about 9%, down from 10% a year earlier. Yaskawa has said it is targeting higher robotics margins through product mix and its newest robot factory.
Three robot makers, three margin outcomes
| Company | Robotics revenue | Margin measure | Margin | Ownership model |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FANUC | ¥378.6 billion (year to Mar 2026) | Group operating margin | 21.4% | Focused, vertically integrated, organic growth |
| ABB Robotics | USD 2.3 billion (2024) | Operational EBITA margin | 12.1% | Division of a conglomerate; sale to SoftBank pending |
| Yaskawa | ¥236.1 billion (FY2025 forecast) | Robotics segment operating margin | About 9% | Motion control company with a robot arm |
Scale alone does not decide who makes money in robotics. Structure does.
Three things explain most of FANUC's lead. It makes its own servo motors, controllers and many key parts, so it keeps margin its rivals pay to suppliers. It concentrates engineering and manufacturing at one site in Yamanashi, which keeps overhead unusually low. And it has grown almost entirely without acquisitions, so it carries no integration costs or goodwill. The ABB sale is a reminder of the reverse: a robotics business competing for capital inside a group with better-returning divisions tends to be underfed and over-burdened.
The lesson for an Indian company is not to copy FANUC's scale, which is out of reach. It is to copy the discipline: pick a narrow category, own the parts of the stack that carry margin, and resist growth that dilutes focus. We compare the margin at each layer in more detail in where the margin sits in robotics.
For integrators, the balance sheet is the business
Operating margin alone flatters or punishes robotics firms unfairly, because the business ties up so much working capital. An integrator typically pays for the arm, the peripherals and its engineers' time up front, then waits for milestone payments that stretch 90 to 180 days after commissioning. Two integrators with the same margin can have very different health if one collects in 60 days and the other in 150.
The metrics that matter are return on capital employed and the cash conversion cycle. A well-run integrator keeps the cycle under about 90 days. One running beyond 120 days is exposed to exactly the growth-induced cash squeeze that has sunk many profitable Indian project businesses. The same logic applies to any Indian business that sells on milestone payments: the payment term is part of the price.
The buyer's arithmetic
For the factory owner, the traditional case is labour replacement: the cost of the robot cell against the fully loaded wages of the operators it frees. A mid-tier arm with gripper, guarding and commissioning can easily cost ₹25 to 50 lakh installed. At Indian wage levels, a cell running one or two shifts often takes four to six years to pay back on labour alone, which is too long for a small firm on thin margins.
Three things are shortening that . Entry prices are falling, led by Chinese cobot makers. Wages and attrition are rising in the main industrial clusters. And export customers increasingly demand a consistency of quality that manual work cannot guarantee. The last point is the one most buyers underweight: when a robot saves a customer rather than a salary, the return calculation changes entirely.
How Indian players mature, and where they stall
The Indian robotics industry is at several stages at once. The subsidiaries of global robot makers have been here for decades and lead on distribution and service rather than on local product development. Hundreds of integrators in Pune, Chennai, Bengaluru and the NCR are organised regional businesses. A small group of Indian product companies, including Addverb, GreyOrange, Systemantics and Ati Motors, is trying to become national or global. And the typical MSME buyer is aware of automation but has not yet committed to it.
Four maturity stages for Indian robotics and automation companies
| Stage | Typical revenue | What it looks like | What holds it back | The move that matters |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Founder-led | ₹5 to 50 crore | One product or service line; founder sells and delivers | Founder bandwidth; no repeatable process | Turn one custom offering into a standard one |
| 2. Regional | ₹50 to 300 crore | Several locations or product lines; key accounts | Engineer hiring; integration margin pressure | Add service contracts and a software layer |
| 3. National | ₹300 to 2,000 crore | Own product or IP; competes with multinationals | Capital intensity; component access | Proprietary platform; export wins |
| 4. Leader | Above ₹2,000 crore | Dominant in end markets; platform lock-in | Talent at scale; Chinese hardware pricing | Ecosystem, M&A, next-generation products |
From stage one to two: productise
The first stall is familiar from every Indian project business. The founder is the best salesperson, the chief engineer and the delivery head. That works up to ₹15 crore or so. Beyond ₹30 to 50 crore, it breaks, and the fix is rarely just hiring.
The fix is productisation. An integrator that can offer a defined cell, say a standard MIG welding cell for two-wheeler frame brackets at a fixed price and a fixed delivery time, has turned an engineering service into something a salesperson can sell and a technician can install from a manual. Engineering hours give way to repeatable assembly hours, and gross margin and sales cycles both improve. The transition typically costs a year or more of flat revenue while the systems are built, which is where founders and investors most often lose patience. We have written about that ceiling in where a founder's instinct stops working.
From stage two to three: own something
A ₹200 crore integrator or distributor is a sound business without a moat. Its supply terms can be repriced by the OEM, its customers can be poached, its engineers can be hired away. The firms that move to the national stage own intellectual property that produces recurring revenue: a fleet-management system, a vision platform, an application library for one industry.
Addverb built its own warehouse robots and orchestration software rather than reselling imported systems, and was bought into by Reliance Industries. GreyOrange's value sits largely in the software that coordinates its robots, not in the machines themselves. Both point the same way: in India, the layer that compounds is software attached to hardware already in the customer's building.
What is driving demand
Production Linked Incentives. The PLI schemes cover 14 sectors with a total outlay of ₹1.97 lakh crore. By March 2025, according to the government, they had drawn ₹1.76 lakh crore of actual investment across 806 approved applications, generating more than ₹16.5 lakh crore of incremental sales and over 12 lakh jobs. Greenfield electronics, automotive, pharmaceutical and food lines built under these schemes are designed with automation from day one. IFR has credited PLI-linked investment with much of India's recent installation growth.
The automotive shift. Automotive is India's largest robot buyer at 45% of 2024 installations. The move to electric drivetrains adds battery-module assembly, power electronics and new body structures that need precision beyond what manual work reliably delivers. The component suppliers who will make those parts are already the fastest-growing robot buyers in the country.
Supply-chain diversification. Multinationals moving part of their production out of China, especially in electronics, bring customer quality standards that assume automated inspection and handling. A contract manufacturer supplying a global phone brand cannot run the variability of a manual line.
Policy intent. MeitY published a Draft National Strategy on Robotics in 2023, proposing a national mission to build domestic capability. It remains a draft framework rather than a funded programme. We would not build a business plan on it until money is committed.
Easier, smarter robots. Vision, force sensing and simpler programming are making robots practical for high-mix, low-volume lines. For Indian plants running dozens of variants on one line, the ability to switch tasks in hours rather than days matters more than raw speed.
Catalysts: where value gets created
Selling more robots does not by itself create value in this industry. Positions that get harder to displace every year do. We see six catalysts for Indian companies, and they reinforce one another.
- A software layer on installed hardware. An integrator with robots in 50 factories that sells each a ₹3 to 5 lakh annual analytics or monitoring subscription adds ₹1.5 to 2.5 crore of recurring, high-margin revenue without finding a single new customer. At 200 factories, the business starts to be valued differently.
- Robots as a service for MSMEs. Converting a ₹30 lakh purchase into a monthly fee moves the barrier from capital to credit. IFR reports that the robot-as-a-service fleet in professional service robotics grew 31% in 2024, driven by exactly this reluctance to pay upfront. The Indian vendor that solves the financing, not the hardware, reaches the largest untouched buyer group in the country. We work through the numbers in robots as a service for MSMEs.
- Exports. Integration and software work sold to Southeast Asian or Middle Eastern manufacturers is priced in dollars, usually carries better margins, and proves the quality of the work to domestic buyers.
- Cobots in the mid-market. Collaborative arms need no cage, can be taught by an operator, and can be moved between tasks. For plants running many SKUs on one line, they are the entry point.
- Domestic manufacturing, slowly. Import duties, local-content preferences and the need for fast service in tier-two industrial towns all favour local production over time. The component constraint means this is a decade-long project, not a five-year one.
- Consolidation. A fragmented base of profitable regional integrators is the classic precondition for roll-ups. The attractive targets are firms dominant in one cluster, with strong key accounts and high repeat business.
The companies that combine two or three of these, typically a vertical focus, a software layer and a service book, compound faster than those relying on any one.
Competitive structure
Globally, FANUC, ABB, Yaskawa and KUKA, the last owned by China's Midea, are estimated to account for more than half of industrial robot shipments. In India the same four lead, joined by Kawasaki, Mitsubishi Electric, Epson and Universal Robots in collaborative arms.
The four tiers competing for Indian robotics revenue
| Tier | Examples | Strength | Weakness |
|---|---|---|---|
| Global robot makers | FANUC India, ABB India, Yaskawa India, KUKA India | Brand trust, parts availability, service networks | Premium pricing; slow in the MSME segment; little local product development |
| Automation majors | Siemens, Mitsubishi Electric, Bosch Rexroth | Plant-wide relationships; bundle robots with controls | Robotics is one line among many |
| Indian product companies | Addverb, GreyOrange, TAL Manufacturing, Systemantics | Local products, faster service, application depth | Scale, brand recognition, funding cycles |
| Specialists and integrators | Ati Motors, Unbox Robotics, Svaya Robotics, regional integrators | Niche depth, agility, local relationships | Founder dependence; service reach beyond home cluster |
The Chinese price shock
The most important competitive change of the next three years is the arrival of Chinese cobot and industrial robot makers at prices well below Japanese and European equivalents. Makers such as Dobot and AUBO sell collaborative arms for a fraction of established brands' prices, and several are building Indian distribution.
Our view is that this splits the market rather than destroying it. The price-only tier will go to the cheapest credible arm. The tier where downtime is expensive will keep paying for guaranteed service response, application libraries and production data. Indian integrators and product companies should decide deliberately which tier they are in. Fighting a hardware price war against Chinese makers is a fight no Indian firm is equipped to win.
What makes a moat here
Robot specifications converge. Payload, reach and repeatability are similar across credible brands. Durable advantage comes from things that accumulate: software that captures a plant's operating data, application know-how in one vertical, a certified installer network, and a high share of customers on annual service contracts. Each takes two to five years to build, and none can be bought quickly by a new entrant.
Risks
Most risks in Indian robotics are not threats to the industry's growth. They are filters that decide which companies capture it.
- The PLI cliff. IFR has warned that Indian installations might contract in 2026 as the incentive programme runs out. Any robotics business whose order book depends on continuing greenfield PLI builds is exposed now, not later. This is the most predictable risk in the sector.
- Chinese pricing. Already present and accelerating. It will compress hardware and distribution margins first, especially in cobots.
- Skills. Robots that nobody on site can reprogram or maintain end up idle. The shortage is of commissioning and maintenance technicians more than of robotics engineers, and training capacity takes years to build.
- Slow MSME adoption. Small plants face upfront cost, old equipment that is hard to retrofit, and limited in-house expertise. If financing models don't solve this, Indian robotics stays a large-manufacturer story.
- Component concentration. Dependence on a handful of Japanese reducer suppliers is a structural exposure for any local arm maker, with no quick domestic alternative.
- Automotive dependence. With 45% of installations going to one sector, an auto downturn flows straight through to robot vendors and integrators.
- Currency. Most hardware is imported and priced in yen, euros or dollars. A weaker rupee squeezes integrators who quoted fixed rupee prices.
Two commonly cited risks are overstated. Mass job losses are implausible at India's current robot intensity: the country is under-automated, not over-automated, and the near-term effect is a shift in job mix toward operators and technicians. And the claim that Chinese robots are too crude for serious factories is out of date. Premium brands must now win on proven uptime, service and data, not on assumed quality.
What to do
If you run an integrator or robotics firm
- Pick one or two verticals and become the obvious specialist in them. Generalist integrators compete on price.
- Define at least one standard cell with a fixed price and delivery time. It is the first step out of the founder bottleneck.
- Sell a service contract with every installation, and track the share of customers on annual contracts as a board metric.
- Build or license a software layer that captures production data from your installed base. That is what changes your valuation.
- Stress-test next year's plan for a PLI slowdown. If the order book collapses without greenfield projects, diversify now.
- Manage the cash conversion cycle as tightly as margin. Milestone terms that stretch beyond 120 days need renegotiating or financing.
If you run a manufacturing MSME
- Start with one cell on your worst job: the highest reject rate, the hardest shift to staff, or the process your biggest customer audits most.
- Build the return case on quality and customer retention as well as labour. The labour case alone rarely pays back quickly enough.
- Price the service and spares commitment before the arm. Downtime is where the economics are won or lost.
- Ask vendors for rental or pay-per-use terms, and compare them against a term loan at your real cost of funds.
- Train two of your own people to operate and adjust the cell before it goes live.
If you invest in the sector
- Separate hardware, integration, software and service revenue in every model. A blended margin hides the business.
- Ask what share of revenue comes from repeat customers within 24 months. A business that cannot sell a second cell to a satisfied first customer has not found its model.
- Look at the cash conversion cycle and return on capital before . Integration businesses can grow themselves into insolvency.
- Check for dependence on PLI-funded greenfield projects and on the automotive sector.
- Value software and service revenue differently from project revenue, and verify that the software is actually used rather than bundled free.
If you are assessing a company in this space, our due diligence work is built for exactly these questions. The broader sector view sits on our robotics industry page.
Our view
The usual reading of India's robotics decade is that it is a question of who and when, not if. We agree with the direction and would sharpen the conclusion. The density gap guarantees volume growth. It does not guarantee that Indian companies capture much of the value, because most of the margin sits in imported components and in the software and service layers that global makers already own.
We would also be more cautious on timing than most forecasts. They tend to assume a smooth climb, while IFR itself flags a possible PLI-linked dip in 2026. A company that plans for that dip, and uses it to build a service book, will be better placed than one that assumed the curve only goes up.
The Indian businesses that matter in 2030 will be the ones that stopped selling projects and started selling uptime. That is a slower way to grow in the first three years and a much better business in the next ten.
Method and sources
This report condenses a longer whitepaper prepared by our research desk. We checked the most material figures against primary sources in September 2026, replaced forecasts with reported results where those were available, and removed figures we could not trace. Margin ranges by value-chain layer and the maturity stages are our own indicative analysis, not audited data.
- International Federation of Robotics, World Robotics 2025, industrial robots press release (September 2025)
- International Federation of Robotics, India press release, World Robotics 2025 (25 September 2025)
- International Federation of Robotics, robot density press release (8 April 2026)
- International Federation of Robotics, World Robotics 2025, service robots press release (October 2025)
- Grand View Research, Industrial Robotics Market report
- IMARC Group, India Robotics Market report 2026 to 2034
- Research and Markets, India Collaborative Robot Market 2025 to 2031
- FANUC Corporation, financial results for the year ended March 31, 2026
- ABB Ltd, ABB to divest Robotics division to SoftBank Group (8 October 2025) and Q2 2026 results (July 2026)
- SoftBank Group Corp., acquisition of ABB Ltd's robotics business (8 October 2025)
- Yaskawa Electric, FY2025 first-half earnings briefing (October 2025)
- Press Information Bureau, progress notes (2025)
- Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Annual Survey of Industries 2023-24
- Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Draft National Strategy on Robotics (2023)
- Nabtesco Corporation, precision reduction gears business information
How useful was this article?
One tap. It tells us what to write more of.
About the author
SRF Capital Studio Research Desk
Funding Intelligence, SRF Capital Studio
The next one
Get what we publish next, by email.
Working notes on raising, borrowing, protecting, growing and structuring capital in India. One email a week at most, and you can leave any time.
We use your address only to send this. See our privacy policy.
We store your address to send you these emails and nothing else. See our privacy policy.
Related reading